THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (A CASE STUDY OF DARFUR CRISIS)

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ABSTRACT

Conflict management, globally is a hectic task, which requires all peacemakers to first, find the root cause of the conflict, probably heed the early warning and importantly dialogue out the issues at stake to encourage peaceful resolution. The United Nations (UN) conflict management in Africa lacking in totality some of this capacity much especially as affecting the Darfur crisis led to the blaming of this kind of diplomacy in place. The character of the conflict and fractionalization of the crisis probably contributed to the persistent and continual escalation of the crisis. A problematic scenario that the work mindful of the contending issues tends to explain while examining the reasons for the failures.

In the process of this, the work utilises primary and secondary data. The primary data includes face-to-face oral interview of a key informants of members of UN staff at Abuja, staff of Sudanese embassy in Nigeria, international law scholars, political scientist, and members of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) staff living in Nigeria. Others are of Nigeria institute of International Affairs (NIIA), and International commentators. The secondary data includes data deal with materials adequate to form good value judgment of the work. This includes archival library method, Web-browsing, journals, conference papers, and communiqués reached at each summits concerning Darfur crisis. The work uses in-depth interview method as its instrument of evaluation. Analytical approach and descriptive concepts was employed. The study is situated at the “Theory of Preventive Diplomacy and International Violence Prevention.”             

The study noted that one of the major problem propping up UN conflict management lapses that had repeatedly hunt the body is late arrivals to conflict zone.  Failure to heed to early warning signals about conflict was also revealed to be one of the UN predicaments. The lapses and loopholes inherent in the UN charter principle relating to the use of peace-enforcement is also adduced as part of problems acting against UN initiatives. The actions of the veto members of the UN and their national interests’ drive are also revealed as part of the problem encouraging poor conflict management.     

Conclusively, the best conflict resolution mechanism is that in which parties to conflict dialogue out their differences, which in turn makes the work of the conflict manager simple. In the course of this condition the root cause of the conflict must be treated, just as the diplomatic examination and mediation must eschew peace and use sincerity and unbiasness to all the parties to conflict as the outcomes forms the bases for peaceful conflict resolution.

 




 

TABLE OF CONTENT


Title Page                                                                                                        i

Certification                                                                                                    ii

Dedication                                                                                                      iii

Acknowledgement                                                                                          iv

Table of Content                                                                                             v

Abstract                                                                                                          vi

 

CHAPTER ONE   THE GENERAL INTRODUCTION                                    1

1.1              Introduction                                                                                        1

1.2              Statement of Problem                                                                                     5

1.3              Objective of Study                                                                              6

1.4              Significance of Study                                                                         7

1.5              Literature Review                                                                                 9

1.6              Theoretical Framework                                                                        19

1.7              Hypotheses                                                                                           23

1.8              Method of Data Collection/Analysis                                                    24

1.9              Limitation of Study                                                                              25

 

CHAPTER TWO THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DARFUR CRISIS  27

2.1              The Historical Origin of Darfur Crisis                                                     27

2.2              The Politics of Darfur Crisis Management and International Diplomacy 31

 

CHAPTER THREE      THE GENERAL ANALYSIS                                       35

3.1              The General Analysis of UN Conflict Management Strategy in Africa         35

3.2              The Appraisal of the factors Affecting UN Conflict Management in Africa  46

3.3              Evaluation of UN Conflict Management Failure in Darfur Crisis.                 54

 

CHAPTER FOUR   THE GENERAL IMPLICATION                                     61

4.1              The General Implication of UN failed Conflict Management System           61

4.2              The Implications of Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Management in

Darfur Crisis                                                                                                   66

 

CHAPTER FIVE   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION                   72

  5.1.  Summary of Findings,                                                                                      72       

5.2. Recommendation                                                                                                 74    5.3. Conclusion                                                                                                   78

 Bibliography                                                                                                             80

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER ONE

1.1       INTRODUCTION

This work is an attempt to explain the processes and procedures adopts by the United Nations towards conflict managements in Africa, with a particular focus on Darfur crisis.

After the end of the cold war, the nature of peacekeeping and the means of managing crisis, particularly in African situation have been profoundly problematic due to the transformed nature and processes that conflict and crisis in Africa had taken. This systematic dimension had encouraged human rights violations, ethno-religion and ethnic cleansing, failed states, failed elections crisis and the changing nature of war, whichmight have put immense challenges for the international community and the UN.

The questions of does the international community like the UN, America, Britain and others have enough capability and political will to respond to these challenges becomes a reason of integrity and sincerity to inquired on. As the UN, itself had consistently reminded the world of its constraints and the negating tendency of meeting up the international community demanding assignments without giving it adequate resources and political support. The UN also has an important role in continents where there is absence of stability, as found in the African continent, where political instabilities had render nullity the existence of continental body like AU and sub-region bodies. The problems of sub-Saharan Africa also receive top little attention from the international body like the United Nations as noted by Ahrtisarri (2004) that the challenges to the African conflicts, as faced by the United Nation, unfortunately paralysed it or at least its functions are severely hampered due to the actions of its members, often those that have a veto right in the security council.

It is this unfortunate scenario that had down - played the attitude of the UN in managing African Crisis in the last decade into the new milleminium. The inability of the UN to make the necessary decisions in the engendering African Crisis like Darfur region of western Sudan informed the situation that erodes the position and prestige of the body. An issue that propped up the body stands at the wake of the Darfur crisis, to only assist the AU peacekeepers. Although, the African Union played a formidable role in advancing the Darfur ceasefires, but because of its poor capacity to managing the crisis, the situations grows. It is also unfortunate that the UN Security Council being unable to act decisively in a timely manner to stop the suffering of the people of the Darfur region helped to escalate the magnitude of killings, suffering and high refuge overflow. The Darfur crisis in the western Sudan is between the government at Khartoum and the indigenous people of South-West Darfur. According to De Waal (2004), the people of Darfur, South – Western Sudan, whose identity formation transcend four centuries, with each process overlapping one another and associated with different period of events in the region’s history are among the people said to have been neglected in the east-west axis of Sudan. These identities includes the Sudanic identities associated with Darfur sultanate, Islamic identities, administrative tribalism associated with the 20th century Sudanese and the recent polarization of Arab and African identities, with a new form of external intrusion and internal violence.

        In the revelation of Grono (2006), the Sudanese conflicts, since 2003, the government of Sudan has responded to an insurgency by rebel groups in Darfur by unleashing its proxy Janjaweed militias on the rebels’ tribal groups. The government supported the resulting ethnic cleansing campaign with well coordinated air strikes and joint ground operations. The two main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), are recruited mainly from the largely agrarian Fur and Massalit and the mostly nomadic Zaghawa, the three largest Darfurian groups of African descent. In the process of the government encounter with the rebel coupled with the government backed Janjaweed havocs, over 250,000 dead, mostly from conflict – related disease malnutrition and outright killings have been record (Sach, 2006:134). With over 2 million being forced out of their home, more than additional 200,000 are currently residing in camps at Chad as refugees (Neuffer,2005:56).

Premised on the severity of the crisis, and to which the Khartoum government have failed in its responsibility to protect its own citizens against atrocities, to which it had wilfully and flagrantly flouted, there was the need for outsiders to intervened. Thereby, turning around to be the prime mover behind the campaign of ethnic cleansing and the unceaseless unleashing of the poor people of the Darfur by the Janjaweed, the international community – UN, US, Britain and China among others had in themselves created the contradiction that makes for peace and crisis settlement far from the people. The reasons behind this role -play, inaction, and awful failure among others shall be further investigated in the course of this endeavour.

 

1.2   STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Crisis management in many African conflicts had been problematic to which several measures had been followed (mostly internal and continental), but failed to yield result. This probably due to poor capacity and capability of this African state on one hand, and or to the other due to the politics of the interest groups, allies, power blocs and the contending forces amongst others. This lapses which call for outside help in many respects and occasions neither had proffered any solution to the exacerbated conflict situations in Africa. In some instance, many had been killed before any help or peace processes are embarked upon. It is the catastrophy of this failures which appealed to outside conscience and help that were still not cogent to save lives that made many victims to look up to UN. The UN in its own never attends to any conflict until after three to six months thereafter, according to Article 6 of the UN Charter principle. Meaning that many might have been killed before the UN intervention might have taken place. This was the case in the Darfur and many other African conflicts. A problematic underpin that in itself does not solve the problem at the expected time and which might not, if not properly managed. Thus, to say, that it is the UN lapses in Darfur conflict that seemed to have encouraged the prolonged war, killings and destructions in Darfur-Sudan.Against this informed view and the issues raise in the background of this study, the followings are the noted research questions of the problems:

i.              What are the lapses cum reasons behind the prolongation of the Darfur crisis under the UN peace and conflict management?

ii.            Do the United Nations failed in making amend to issues of early warning in African crisis vis-à-vis intervention.

iii.           Does the United Nations have a critical limitation towards its mandates for not intervening in the Darfur crisis?

iv.           Why are political powers in many African states hooked to ethnic cleavages, thereby making conflict resolutions problematic?

v.            Why is the UN intervention and management of African conflict always treated differently?

 

1.3    OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

In view of the raised problems, the following are the research adduced objectives of study:

a.            To investigate the lapses inherent in the International diplomatic order which had allowed the Darfur crisis to last longer than expected.

b.            To examine why political power in many African States, with Sudan-Darfur inclusive, is coloured by ethnic division, which had rendered the conflict management under UN a problematic in the region.

c.            To examine the parity and divorce of interest of veto – member state toward continuity of conflict, their interest, and the UN general intention for global peace.

d.            To re-examine the role of the international community who is not ready to commit their troops on the ground in Sudan, but worried, disturbed and ready to see that what is happening in Darfur are brought to end through support for African solutions.

e.            To expose the role of the international community who is good at keeping people alive with humanitarian assistance until they are massacred without immediate ending of conflicts

 

1.4    SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

This study is however, significance in several ways.

Firstly, the study probably tend to explain the weakness in the United Nations’ management of African conflicts, especially in the areas that bordered on life and death of peacekeepers, observers and humanitarian efforts among others.Of which in conflict situation anybody can fall a victim to strain bullets apart from the combatants in battlefield, the UN should therefore cease in using such as a reason for not intervening in time.

Secondly, the work wish to explicate the intricate character of UN veto – members who tend to create clog in the body’s process of making peace in conflict zone owing to their individual interest, thereby leading to escalation of such conflicts as the role of China and Russia in Sudan are anti progress to the proper UN crisis management in Darfur.

Thirdly, the international community who in several years past avowed that never again will it watch the innocence exterminated by those who suppose and have the responsibility to protect them do same should always be ready to commit their troops when such matter as conflict (Power, 1996) as currently going in Darfur arises, so as to uphold the sincerity and integrity people and citizens world over imposed on them.

Fourthly, the United Nations proper management of conflicts, whether in Africa or elsewhere should be the cardinal point of the body in stepping into any conflict zone. The idea of biasness, inaction and delay to early warning should equally be discarded as its alertness provides hope and courage to that fleeing conflict zone.

Finally, the United Nations intervention and management of conflict in Africa becomes a thing of interest and seriousness when the body employed the necessary machinery toward ending all form of conflict irrespective of which interest is at stake or being deterred. Peace being the goal of the body should not be negotiated on greed of interest.

The work apart from explicating the importance of the UN role in African conflict management, also add to extend the frontier of knowledge. The work, however, closes the gaps in literature on the issue of preventive diplomacy and the lapses inherent in the UN conflict management system, especially as affecting Africa conflicts.

 

1.5   LITERATURE REVIEW

Premised on the topic of study, this section will be viewed in three different perspectives with the intention of bringing out the scholarly assertions vis-à-vis thesub-headings. These are: The state of conflict management: A global overview, the ploy to conflict situation in Africa, and the Darfur crisis and the international community.

i.      THESTATEOFCONFLICTMANAGEMENT: A GLOBAL           OVERVIEW.

The end of cold war, precariously throw up several issues in the world politics. For while some jubilates for the end of cold war, others used the period to procure and re-armed, thereby engaging in deadly conflict. Yet another sees the post – cold war euphoria as truly over. However, to the international body – the United Nations, it was a world community faced with fragile and disorderly political landscape, exacerbated and staggered conflicts that its management was not only a grave problem but complex and disturbing. To this effects, Black (2003;45) notes that nowhere is this more apparent than at the United Nations, especially in conflict management, where the promise of a new era of human intervention and second generation multi-national operation has given way to uncertainty, second – guessing and soul – searching. He further argued that there are a set of challenges surrounding the expanded peace menu – including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. Clanton (1999) agreeing with the view of Black asserts that it is the hardship created by the challenges that impel on how to expand the range of instruments and opportunities to be deployed in a way which avoid, becoming part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

In another reason, Dedring (2003) observed that the UN management of crisis is bedeviled by several problems. These problems, he noted bother on unimproved capacity, unable to meet the challenges of early warning and unattainable challenges of preventing violent conflicts. He further argued on the need for preparedness as effective early warning and analysis without a prompt and appropriate response is clearly of little value.

Knight (2003) arguing from the point of view of principle notes that the UN as a matter of principle should as the central authority have a subsidiary function, performing only those task which cannot be performed at a more immediate level. This argument is premised on the fact that in the light of the overburdened condition of the UN’s own peace and security function with the various regional organs. He concluded by noting that the principle of subsidiary provides a foundation on which this can be done.

Maclnnis (2003) arguing on this line of reason noted that the serial problems encountered in state crisis management are due to non-devolution of peace and security responsibilities to regional agencies. He however averred that for solution and proper coordination of programme and activities to be attained that the need to devolve function is a one way of attaining success in crisis management. While extolling the content of preventive diplomacy, Maclnnis observed that proper state crisis management can be initiated to succeed when the dangers of losing sight of the distinction between peacemaking and peace-enforcement are abridged. This is because, according to him, compromising what he sees as the vital peacekeeping resources of impartiality, can lead to hardship and extremely difficult situations.

Day (2003) agreeing with the above notion contended that what had fall short of most of the UN crisis management is the breach of the above mentioned distinction, which make the perception of impartiality extremely difficult to recapture. However, another view that (Maclinns, 2003) rose on this subject was in agreement with (Dedring, 2003) view, on what they termed the validity of the concept of conflict prevention, which to them is the first step toward conflict management.

It is however in line with this notion that UN – EU (2003) agreed on effective multilateralism and cooperation in conflict management. The document also informed that it is based on this cooperation that the UN – EU intensified cooperation in African, Balkan and Middle East conflicts. Abel (2004) in reviewing this contention asserts that cooperation could be the nearest view point to achieving global security through conflict management.

However, in a different stand point Grunewald (2004) argued that one of the problem bedevilling the UN peace intention had always be on slow to respond to unfolding conflict. To him other issues facing the body toward conflict management are the lack of protection to the civilian population, and then the problem of organization and lack of coherent and solid strategy among others helped to ending several conflict management intentions.

Agreeing with Grunewald Francis on the stated contentions, Grono (2006) recounted how the UN failed to protect and manage the crisis in Darfur. He agreed that the poor management in Darfur crisis had also contributed to the failure to protect, prevent, and encourage development in the continent. He further noted that there are number of substantial obstacles created by the UN management itself toward successful implementation of its policies and crisis management projects.

 

ii.     THE PLOY TO CONFLICT SITUATION AND MANAGEMENT IN             AFRICA: NEGATIVE ISSUES

Generally speaking, every conflict either intra or inter in Africa among others usually attract reactions, supports, sympathizers and or beneficiaries. To this end, despite the kind of killings and ploy to the solutions, the condition of things in Angola crisis, Rwandan crisis, Liberian crisis and Darfur crisis had not been favourable. This, according to Chalk (1999: 100) is due to the fact that while states are acknowledging the existence of conflict, however, never agreedon the magnitude of its volatility less the need to intervene in a somewhat ethnic or political issue. Against this dismay and growing foot-dragging, Friedman (1995) observed that to try to extinguish one of these ethnic conflicts when it is raging at full force is futile. This is because the tribal impulse for survival and revenge in such a situation is like a political blow torch. No amount of rational argument can tone it down, and if you try to smooth it with your own body or any, it will burn a hole right through you.

While this may be the basic reason for the Western role in African conflict (Alusala, 2004) however, in a disagreement noted that it is unfair. For the UN mission in most of African conflict zone and its officials wouldn’t have kept quiet, since they are aware of the flooding of many conflict states’ street with weapons but could not cope or monitor the scale of illicit arms trading as existed in Rwanda, Angola and Darfur among others. Brown (2004: 10) in support of Alusala’s view and against the stand and negligence of the UN in most cases aptly noted that a case in point is the Rwanda crisis of 1994 when a week after the massacre of the Tutsi began in Rwanda, the force commander insisted that he could end the carnage if given 5,000 - 8,000 troops in addition but the UN in its excuse reduced the number. Added to this (Dedring, 2003) argued that even when the UN was informed of the situation in Darfur in 2000, the UN chilled it like no case. Ferrogario (2001) in submission noted that despite overwhelming evidence of killings and knowledge as to its perpetrators, the UnitedStates official decided against taking a leading role in confronting the slaughter in Rwanda and in Darfur recognised as genocide but failed to act.

Totten (2004) decrying the presence and doing nothing attitude of international community in African conflict zone noted that their reaction are positive if there are mineral resources or something to gain.But disagreeing with the above Gourevitch (1998) asserts that even in the presence of the international community that the Darfur crisis had persisted and proved unmanageable to the chief supervisor – the UN, despite the all odds, so what are we basing it on. Cohen (2004) further argued that while there is ploy to conflict continuity in Africa, it is because most conflict or crisis are sponsored or aided by the actors who are present at the conflict zone.

Thus, (Brown, 2004) aptly states that those who had high hopes in the early 1990s for the international community’s conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution capabilities were chagrined by the international community’s inability to prevent, stop or resolve most of the violent conflicts in Africa.

         In support of this contention Linden, (1996) observed that the most tragic of all however, was the inactivity of the UN and its failure in several African conflicts. He further notes that the ploy strategy had help in making African conflict and the states a meaningless venture for peace attainment. This is sequel to the kind of excuses even when they are observing the conflict to the detriment of the victims.

 

c.     DARFUR CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The Darfur crisis, which started in 2003 however, coincided with several other crises, like the Burundi, Iraq and other places. The conflict was seen to have played out in the depths of the desert and hence termed another African civil war (Patten, 2007). But even as the war persisted, the intervention of the international community was never pronounced. Thus, Grunewald (2005) observed that the international community was slow to respond to the unfolding conflict in Darfur. This is against the fact that probably explained the volatility of the conflict, which included the fractionalization of the conflict into several rebel groups.

According to the ICG (2009) the non-immediate attendance to the crisis between 2003 – 2004 saw a high rate of death due to the high period of fighting. To them it was a period when no organ or international group could manage the conflict, thereby resulting in a mutated conflict, splintered parties, and multiplication of the confrontations.

Morton (2004) in his view noted that international peacekeeping was not yet effective and political settlement was also far off. Against this uncoordinated management of things in Darfur Bush (2006) contended that America is frustrated with regard to the UN handling of the Darfur crisis. He further asserts that I have said, and this government has said, there’s genocide taking place in Sudan. And it breaks our collective hearts to know that. He went on to reiterate that the best way to solve the Darfur crisis is by charting a political as well as security track. He frankly blames the UN for the shortfall as regarding insecurity and poor management of crisis in Darfur region.

In support of this assertion over the negative role of the UN in Darfur, Grono (2006) noted that the UN had failed in its responsibility to protect human life in Darfur. He further reiterated that much more must be done to prevent conflict in Africa if development in the continent is to be accelerated. Agreeing with the expressed notion De Waal (2004) aptly states that the UN incapacitation are due to twin track diplomacy of her major players, hence that the body should not be blamed in totality. He further contended that the UN is doing the bidding of the interest groups in Darfur thus, the lost of sense of responsibility. In another development while agreeing with the views above, Ahrtisarri (2004 : 46) deduced that weak or ineffective political institutions help to diminish the society capacity to manage social tensions in a  non-violent manner. He further asserts that those who are interested in security should be more interested in development. For the prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development to which Darfur was lacking.

However, Collier (2004) in a categorical contention noted that the majority of today armed conflicts as occurring in Darfur is of internal rather than between. This is because most conflict initiators make it so hard for the international body and agencies to approach. To which, he noted with Darfur inclusive had led to abundance failed states in Africa.

Against the above held views, it is evident that several factors and problems acting as impediment had helped in the Darfur crisis failure and poor management system both from inside and outside African. However, it is this imperatives and many other factors that will be examined in the body of the work since they are now a thrown up problems.

 

1.6   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

One of the sound footings of crisis management in the context of human enterprises goes with the measures put in place by the concerned group, organization and individuals alike. Thus, in the context of the Darfur crisis vis-à-vis UN management of crisis, and according to the RESPONSIBILITY to ACT of the UN Charter Principle 39, 40, and 41, this study is situated on the ‘Theory of Preventive DiplomacyandInternational Violence Prevention’. This theory holds that conflict or violence prevention can only be attained when the common goal of avoiding escalation of dispute are put in place to avert as such by initiation. Meaning, that in every conflict, there is the tendency for escalation and de-escalation of which prevention finds its place before the beginning of escalation and also at end of de-escalation. This also notes to suggest that in escalation, conflict prevention is a short-term intervention in order to encourage a peaceful solution. While in the process of de-escalation, conflict prevention is a prolonged initiative to stabilise and solidify a new peace agreement.

The scholars of this school includes Massimo Fusato, David Black, Andy Knight, Ted Gurr, John Maclnnis, Peter Haydon, JuergenDedring, Michale Lund, Graham Day and Robert Huebbert among others.

These scholars, however argued that the necessary measures towards conflicts prevention are the act of monitoring a tense situation, intervening to stabilize a potentially violence conflict before its outbreaks; initiating activities that address the root cause as well as the triggers of a dispute; establishing mechanism to detect early warning signals and monitor specific indicators that  may  help  to predict  impending  violence; coordinating intervention to prevent the creation of conflictual situations, and institutionalizing the idea of preventing violence at the local, regional and international levels among others.

It is in relation of this view above that Massimo (2003), divorcing his view form short-term intervention of preventive diplomacy argued that a new focus, more comprehensive, the structural prevention approach which includes long-term initiatives, meant to targeting the root causes of conflict are more adducible. The United Nations (1992), although, had argued that crisis management under its Agenda for peace, in the short-term could suggest that the international communitys’ could intervene flexibly and effectively to prevent the explosion of conflicts. But unfortunately, this was not allowed to apply in the case of Yugoslavia and Rwanda owing to the behaviour of her neighbours, according to the UN.

According to (Massimo, 2003) structural preventive diplomacy has its root in part of international relations theory especially on relationship among states. Thus, the core value of structural preventive diplomacy centred on norms, values, and share interests among relating states. This is because the peaceful interaction among different groups within a state can be fostered by structural initiatives of constitutional engineering, economic development and institution building.

Galtung (1988:34) accepting this notion was of the view that security community and warm peace is essential ingredient to structural preventive diplomacy because it also helps to identifying the structural foundation of a peaceful international community.However, Lund (1996:17) disagreeing with the views of Massimo and Galtung, favoured preventive diplomacy being in short-term intervention. He detested structural prevention approach and said that it is too broad and difficult to distinguished from general processes of democratization or economic development and eventually closer to the concept of peace building. This might mean to say that one’s notion of violence/conflict prevention affects the others assumptions about when this activity can and should be done, and what should be done.

It is this notion that informed scholars who argued that the stage a conflict is in is very important in determining what intervention tools are most likely to be effective. Early-warning indicators and signs help to define the timing and the targets of the preventive measures.

Gurr (1993:21) in his view while agreeing with the contentions above noted that a quantitative system analysis to check randomly whether minority groups are at risk is another way of preventing conflict. This deduction is due to the fact that in every conflict zone it is the minority group that are always affected. The monitoring and consistent touches are the diplomatic relations establishing the state of their well being.

However, going by the way of postulation by scholars, both for those who favour preventive diplomacy on short-term and those who advocates for structural preventive diplomacy, which is in long term intervention, it is pertinent to note that the role of the United Nations crisis management in Darfur might be as added by scholars that apart from diplomacy and military operations, that the needs for preventive diplomacy should stretch to includes institution building, economic development, and grassroots community building. Since with such make-up, an effective preventive strategy that might required a comprehensive approach that encompasses both short-term and long-term political diplomacy whose absence had been felt at Darfur might be used as a measure by the international community, in cooperation with national and regional actors to better the lots of those trapped in conflict zones like Darfur.

 

1.7   HYPOTHESES

The deduced hypotheses of this work are:

i.             That the lapses inherent in the international diplomatic order, especially as was in the case of Darfur, largely accounted for persistent of the crisis.

ii.            That political power in many African states, and Sudan inclusive, is coloured by ethnic division, thereby rendering conflict management in the state problematic.

 

1.8   METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION/ANALYSIS

The research is essentially qualitative in design. It included both primary and secondary data. The primary data were sourced through in-depth interview method, by oral face-to-face interview. The interviews were based on unstructured questions. The choice of unstructured method is based on its flexibility, which allows for cordial relationship and interaction between the investigator and the interviewee.

Those interviewed included the United Nations (UN) staff at Abuja Nigeria, members of Sudanese embassy in Abuja Nigeria, members of the Justice and Equality Movement living now in Abuja Nigeria, members of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, International Law Scholars and members of Nigerian peacekeeping Unit at Jaji Kaduna, Nigeria.

The secondary sources of data collection comprises materials from internet and library. Documents were sourced from several libraries in Lagos, Abuja, Enugu and peacekeeping Unity library at Kaduna.

However, in the course of analysis, the research employed descriptive and evaluation concepts. The instrument used also was in-depth interview method.


1.9   LIMITATION OF STUDY

The investigation of this work from its inception was limited by several factors which acted and or tended to mar the goal of the work. Amongst which is the timing of the study as the conflict in Darfur was still ongoing. There was the problem of been unable to meet up with time which acted greatly against the intended period. Most of the international scholars, UN agents and Humanitarian staff resident in Nigeria were not critical and ready to release information of important vis-à-vis the crisis in Darfur. The UN/AU Headquarters are also not keen in receiving or attending to investigators on the subject matter.

The study, meanwhile encountered some financial problems, lack of specific and current text on the case study. Poor library and archival materials, and general logistics problems were forces that compelled and delayed the early completion of the work. All which fall as a great limitation to the supposedly early completion of the study.

Finally, in order to ensure objectivity of comments and remarks, secondary data such as newspapers, magazine, periodic and journals among others, consideration was placed on unbiasness.

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